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Abstract 
The paper argues that digital ontology (the ultimate nature of reality is digital, and the 
universe is a computational system equivalent to a Turing Machine) should be carefully 
distinguished from informational ontology (the ultimate nature of reality is structural), 
in order to abandon the former and retain only the latter as a promising line of research. 
Digital vs. analogue is a Boolean dichotomy typical of our computational paradigm, but 
digital and analogue are only “modes of presentation” of Being (to paraphrase Kant), 
that is, ways in which reality is experienced and/or conceptualised by an epistemic agent 
at a given level of abstraction. A preferable alternative is provided by an informational 
approach to structural realism, according to which knowledge of the world is knowledge 
of its structures. The most reasonable ontological commitment turns out to be in favour 
of an interpretation of reality as the totality of structures dynamically interacting with 
each other. The paper is the first part (the pars destruens) of a two-part piece of 
research. The pars construens, entitled “A Defence of Informational Structural 
Realism”, is forthcoming in Synthese. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the age-old question about the discrete vs. continuous nature of reality
1
  
has been recast in the more fashionable terms of digital vs. analogue ontology. As such, 
it has enjoyed a remarkable revival. However, as will become clear in due course, this is 
a typical case of old wine in new bottles. And I shall argue that Kant’s conclusion, 
reached against the more classic, old dichotomy in the context of the “antinomies of 
pure reason” (Kant [1998], A 434-5/B 462-3), has lost none of its value when applied to 
the most recent reformulation of the same alternative. 
The paper is structured into four other main sections. Section two provides a 
brief introduction to what is known as digital ontology. In section three, the longest, a 
new thought experiment is introduced in order to show that digital (discrete) vs. 
analogue (continuous) is a Boolean dichotomy typical of the computational paradigm of 
our age, but both digital and analogue are only “modes of presentation of Being” (to 
paraphrase Kant), that is, ways in which reality is experienced and conceptualised by an 
epistemic agent, at a given level of abstraction (LoA). They do not pick up some 
knowledge- or LoA-independent properties, intrinsic to the external world. Although 
this conclusion applies both to digital and to analogue ontologies, the paper concentrates 
mainly on the criticism of digital ontology (hence its title) because its constructive goal 
is to clear the ground for a defence of informational ontology, which is often confused 
with digital ontology. Section four further clarifies the argument by answering three 
potential objections. Section four, which concludes the paper, provides a positive note 
and an explanation of the more constructive rationale for the argument developed in the 
previous sections. The paper is the first part (the pars destruens) of a two-part piece of 
research. The pars construens is developed in a separate article, entitled “A Defence of 
Informational Structural Realism”, which is forthcoming in Synthese. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Holden [2004] provides an enlightening and insightful analysis of the modern debate, to which I’m 
indebted. I have also relied on the excellent article by Lesne [2007]. 
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2. What is Digital Ontology? It from Bit 
Konrad Zuse
2
 is acknowledged by many as the father of digital ontology.
3
 According to 
him and to digital ontologists in general: 
1) the nature of the physical universe (time, space and every entity and process in 
space-time) is ultimately discrete. 
This thesis, with which we shall be engaged for the rest of the paper, may be 
accompanied by (a selection of) three other, related theses:  
2) the physical universe can be adequately modelled by discrete values like the 
integers; 
3) the evolution (state transitions) of the physical universe is computable as the 
output of a (presumably short) algorithm; and 
4) the laws governing the physical universe are entirely deterministic.  
Theses (1) and (2) give away the neo-Pythagorean nature of digital ontology (Steinhart 
[2003]): reality can be decomposed into ultimate, discrete indivisibilia. Philosophers 
still disagree on the precise definition of “digital” and “analogue”,
4
 but they accept that 
a necessary feature of what it means for something to be digital is that of being discrete, 
and this will suffice for the purposes of this paper.  
Thesis (3) interprets the neo-Pythagorean ontology in computational terms: the 
ultimate, discrete indivisibilia are actually computable digits, while elegance and 
Ockham’s razor inclines digital ontologists to favour an algorithmic theory as simple as 
possible (see Feynman [1992], quoted below in § 3.3.2). Thus, a digital ontology “[...] is 
based on two concepts: bits, like the binary digits in a computer, correspond to the most 
microscopic representation of state information; and the temporal evolution of state is a 
digital informational process similar to what goes on in the circuitry of a computer 
                                                 
2
 Zuse is famous for having constructed the first fully operational program-controlled electromechanical 
binary calculating machine (the Z3) in 1941, see Zuse [1993]. 
3
 Digital ontology is also known as digital physics or digital metaphysics and digital philosophy, and has a 
scientific counterpart in digital physics, see Steinhart [1998] for an introduction and Steinhart [2003] for a 
review chapter. For a recent bibliography see http://digitalphysics.org/Publications/ 
4
 The debate between Goodman [1968] and Lewis [1971] on the actual nature of the “digital” has been 
recently revisited by Müller [forthcoming]. On the unnecessary distinction between discrete and 
discretised system see Lesne [2007]: “It now appears that there is no reason to make a fundamental 
distinction between discrete and discretized systems: an object seems to be intrinsically discrete, even 
isolated, only if we choose the proper glasses” (p. 14). The “glasses” are interpreted more formally in this 
paper in terms of levels of abstraction. 
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processor.” (Fredkin [2003b], 188). In a nutshell, “we are run by a short algorithm” 
(Schmidhuber [1997], p. 205).  
As for thesis (4), this is presented by supporters of digital ontology
5
 as a direct 
consequence of theses (1)-(3) and explicitly related by them to Einstein’s reluctance to 
accept the conclusion that the universe might be intrinsically probabilistic. The 
suggestion is that the analysis of physical laws in terms of deterministic state transitions 
may be made compatible with the ostensibly probabilistic nature of quantum 
phenomena, while being sufficiently flexible to overcome other criticisms.
6
 
The position that unifies most supporters of digital ontology is summarised in 
what is known as Zuse Thesis: 
ZT) “the universe is being deterministically computed on some sort of giant but discrete 
computer” (Zuse [1969]).  
The computer referred to in ZT could be a cellular automaton. This is argued by Zuse 
[1967], also on the basis of Von Neumann [1966], by Fredkin [2003b] and, more 
recently, by Wolfram [2002].
7
 Indeed, a variant of ZF, which is less general, is known 
as Fredkin-Zuse Thesis: “The Universe is a cellular automaton” (Petrov [2003]). 
Alternatively, the computer in ZT could be a universal Turing machine, as suggested by 
Schmidhuber [1997], who in turn acknowledges his intellectual debt to Zuse himself; or 
a quantum computer, as proposed more recently by Lloyd [2006]. Other well-known 
                                                 
5
 Fredkin [1992] presents the point with usual clarity: “Uncertainty is at the heart of quantum mechanics. 
Finite Nature requires that we rule out true, locally generated randomness because such numbers would 
not, in this context, be considered finite. [...] The deterministic nature of finite digital processes is 
different in that it is unknowable determinism. From within the system an observer will never be able to 
know very much about the true microscopic state of that system. Every part of space is computing its 
future as fast possible, while information pours in from every direction. The result is the same as caused 
by the apparent randomness of quantum mechanical processes.”. See also 'T Hooft [2002] and 'T Hooft 
[2005]. 
6
 For example, digital ontology seems inconsistent with Bell's theorem, but a solution to bypass the 
problem, known as pre-determinism ('T Hooft [2005]), is based on what Bell himself acknowledged as a 
possibility: if a model is completely deterministic, then even the experimenter's decision to measure some 
components of the spins is entirely pre-determined, so she could not have decided to measure anything 
else but what she did measure. 
7
 To be precise, it has been argued that is unclear whether Wolfram means to support the view that the 
universe is a classical cellular automaton. Wolfram acknowledges Zuse’s and Fredkin’s work on pp. 
1026-1027, but only very briefly and states that “no literal mechanistic model can ever in the end 
realistically be expected to work.” I follow Edwin Clark’s interpretation in reading this as a rejection of 
classical cellular automata. Wolfram seems to have in mind something slightly different “[...] what must 
happen relies on phenomena discovered in this book – and involves the emergence of complex properties 
[...]”. The potential differences between Fredkin and Wolfram on this issue, however, are not significant 
for the discussion of the tenability of a digital ontology. 
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proponents of versions of ZT include David Chalmers [1996], the Nobel laureate Gerard 
'T Hooft [1997], and Gregory Chaitin [2005]. The latter has explicitly interpreted digital 
ontology as a contemporary development of Pythagoras’ metaphysics, Democritus’ 
atomism and Leibniz’s monadology. Indeed, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
called any philosopher who holds a “discrete” ontology a Monadologist. 
The overall perspective, emerging from digital ontology, is one of a metaphysical 
monism: ultimately, the physical universe is a gigantic digital computer. It is fundamentally 
composed of digits, instead of matter or energy, with material objects as a complex secondary 
manifestation, while dynamic processes are some kind of computational states transitions. There 
are no digitally irreducible infinities, infinitesimals, continuities, or locally determined 
random variables. In short, the ultimate nature of reality is not smooth and random but grainy 
and deterministic.
8
 
Since in the rest of this paper I shall be concerned only with the digital vs. 
analogue nature of reality, namely thesis (1) to be found at the beginning of this section, 
let me conclude this brief presentation of digital ontology with a final comment about 
the computational nature of the physical universe. It concerns an important distinction 
that needs to be kept in sight and to which I shall briefly return in the conclusion. 
 We have seen that digital ontologists tend to be computationally-minded and 
hence subscribe to some version of the pancomputational thesis, according to which the 
physical universe is a computational system of some kind, where the kind is irrelevant 
as long as the preferred models are computationally equivalent, like Turing machines, 
cellular automata, quantum computers or indeed even recurrent neural networks.
9
 
However, digital ontology and pancomputationalism are independent positions. 
Famously, Wheeler supported the former but not (or at least not explicitly) the latter. As 
he wrote:  
 
                                                 
8
 “A fundamental question about time, space and the inhabitants thereof is ‘Are things smooth or grainy?’ 
Some things are obviously grainy (matter, charge, angular momentum); for other things (space, time, 
momentum, energy) the answers are not clear. Finite Nature is the assumption that, at some scale, space 
and time are discrete and that the number of possible states of every finite volume of space-time is finite. 
In other words Finite Nature assumes that there is no thing that is smooth or continuous and that there are 
no infinitesimals.” Fredkin [1992]. 
9
 I do not know anyone supporting this position, perhaps because artificial neural networks are not usually 
analysed algorithmically, but it is available insofar as any algebraically computable function can be 
expressed as a recurrent neural network, see Hyötyniemi [1996] and Siegelmann [1998].  
 7
It from bit. Otherwise put, every ‘it’ – every particle, every field of force, even the space-time 
continuum itself – derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely – even if in some 
contexts indirectly – from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, 
bits. ‘It from bit’ symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom – a very 
deep bottom, in most instances – an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call 
reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes–no questions and the registering of 
equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin 
and that this is a participatory universe (Wheeler [1990], 5).  
 
Physical processes in Wheeler’s participatory universe might, but need not, be reducible to 
computational state transitions. On the other hand, pancomputationalists like Lloyd [2006], 
who describes the universe not as a Turing Machine but as a quantum computer, can 
still hold an analogue or hybrid
10
 ontology. Laplace’s demon, for example, is an 
analogue pancomputationalist. And informational ontologists like Sayre [1976], or 
myself (Floridi [2004] and Floridi [forthcoming]) do not have to embrace either a digital 
ontology or a pancomputationalist position as described in Zuse Thesis. The distinction 
between digital ontology, informational ontology and pancomputationalism is crucial in 
order to understand the strategy of this paper, which is to criticise digital ontology in 
order to make room for an informational approach to structural realism, defended in 
Floridi [forthcoming], while not committing it to pancomputationalism. I will return to 
this point in the conclusion. With this clarification in mind, we can now turn to the 
objections against digital ontology. 
 
2.1. Digital Ontology: From Physical to Metaphysical Problems  
When discussing digital ontology, two separate questions arise: 
a) whether the physical universe might be adequately modelled digitally and 
computationally, independently of whether it is actually digital and computational in 
itself; and 
b) whether the ultimate nature of the physical universe might be actually digital and 
computational in itself, independently of how it can be effectively or adequately 
modelled. 
                                                 
10
 Hybrid computers comprise features of analog computers and digital computers. The digital component 
normally serves as the controller and provides logical operations; the analog component normally serves 
as a solver of differential equations. Plagiarism disclaimer: the previous definition is the source of the 
corresponding definition in Wikipedia, not vice versa. 
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The first is an empirico-mathematical question that, so far, remains unsettled. I shall say 
a bit more about it in this section, but the rest of the paper is not concerned with it. The 
second is a metaphysical question that, in the rest of the paper, I hope to show to be ill-
posed and hence, when answered, to be mis-applied. 
Answers to (a) and (b) are often found intertwined. The following passage by 
Edward Fredkin, one of the earnest supporters of digital ontology, provides a good 
example of a unified synthesis: 
 
[digital ontology] is a totally atomistic system. Everything fundamental is assumed to be atomic 
or discrete; and thereby so is everything else. In physics, DP [digital philosophy, what has been 
called in this paper digital ontology] assumes that space and time are discrete. There are two 
mathematical models of such systems. The first is Diophantine analysis; the mathematics of the 
integers. The second is automata theory; the mathematics of digital processes. We choose the 
latter as it also has the property of explicitly representing a discrete temporal process, while the 
mathematics of the integers simply establishes a set of true theorems and thus can represent 
implicitly only temporal processes. Tremendous progress in the sciences followed the discovery 
of the calculus (and partial differential equations) as a way of mathematically representing 
physical-temporal relationships. But we look elsewhere with respect to the most fundamental 
models of physical processes. What we must demand of DP is the eventual ability to derive, 
from our DP models of fundamental processes, the same mathematical equations that constitute 
the basis of science today. Conway’s Game of Life [a famous cellular automaton, my added 
comment] is a good example of a simple digital system and the consequent emergent properties. 
We arbitrarily assume that DP represents state by patterns of bits, as is done in ordinary 
computers. All of the fundamental transformations we can do with bits in a computer are really a 
subset of what mathematics can do with the integers. [...] The bits of DM [digital mechanics] 
exist at points in a regular digital spacetime, where each point contains one bit of information. 
We think of spacetime as digital since it is made up only of points located where all of the 
coordinates are integers. Automata theory and computer science lead us to believe that the 
representation of state by bits imposes no limitations beyond the fact that everything is 
ultimately quantized. Computers and their software are the most complex things ever made by 
man. However, computation is based on the simplest principles ever discovered. Our world is 
complex and we are looking for simple models that might be at the bottom. The principles of DP 
require us to find and start with the simplest possible models. Thus the unit of state is the bit, 
which is considerably simpler than a real number. (Fredkin [2003b], 190-191). 
 
As the passage illustrates, the empirico-mathematical and the metaphysical position 
with respect to digital ontology are compatible and complementary. Consider the 
following way of interpreting Digital Ontology. Physical simulations or models may 
share the same ontology with their simulated or modelled systems. Thus, a wind tunnel, 
used to investigate the effects of wind-speed and flow around solid objects, is actually 
windy, more or less spacious, may contain several physical objects, and so forth. 
However, digital (computer) simulations or models often have a different ontology from 
their corresponding systems. A computational fluid dynamics simulation, used to model 
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and simulate the behaviour of flowing air, is neither windy nor wet in itself. However, I 
emphasised “often” because this is not always the case. For example, computer 
simulations are routinely used to test and debug other application programs, in which 
case simulator and simulated share the same digital ontology. Digital ontology may then 
be interpreted as arguing that one could have a digital model or simulation of the 
ultimate nature of the physical universe which ends up sharing the same digital ontology 
with the modelled system.  
Although an answer to (a) could then pave the way to an answer to (b), it is 
useful to keep the two issues separate because they face different challenges.  
The empirico-mathematical position seeks to answer question (a) and it is 
weaker, and hence more defensible, than the metaphysical position, which seeks to 
answer question (b), because it may avoid any ontological commitment to the ultimate 
nature of reality. That a system might be modelled and simulated digitally, e.g. as a 
cellular automaton, does not imply that the intrinsic nature of that system is digital. This 
lack of ontological commitment may be an advantage and, occasionally, the weaker 
position seems to be all that digital ontologists wish to hold. Toffoli [2003], for 
example, who sympathizes with digital ontology, has proposed to treat Digital Ontology 
as a heuristically interesting line of research:  
We argue that a nonfrivolous [sic] aspect of this Digital Perspective is its heuristic capacity: to 
help us guess which aspects of our understanding of nature are more “universal,” more robust, 
more likely to survive theoretical and experimental challenges. Behaviors that are substrate-
independent—that can, for instance, thrive well on a digital support, even though they are 
traditionally imagined as taking place in a continuum—are especially promising candidates. (p. 
147). 
 
And Fredkin [online] himself suggests that 
there are computer systems (cellular automata) that may be appropriate as models for 
microscopic physical phenomena. Cellular automata are now being used to model varied 
physical phenomena normally modelled by wave equations, fluid dynamics, Ising models, etc. 
We hypothesize that there will be found a single cellular automaton rule that models all of 
microscopic physics; and models it exactly. We call this field DM, for digital mechanics. 
 
Both passages could easily be read as addressing only question (a). 
If Digital Ontology is an answer to (a) and not (also) to (b), then, even if 
objections against the metaphysical value of digital ontology may be correct, nothing 
could be inferred from them with regard to the scientific tenability of digital physics 
weakly interpreted. Perhaps someone may wish to argue that the latter would be 
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damaged by a lack of ontological support but, personally, I doubt this would be of much 
consequence to the digital physicist. 
So, let us suppose that digital ontologists would prefer to support their position 
as an answer to (a) and not to (b), in order to avoid metaphysical complications. Even 
the weaker position is not devoid of problems. In terms of empirical ontology, the 
majority of physicists either ignores or is positively sceptical about the value of the 
approach. In the words of a supporter of digital ontology: 
 
Several speakers in this meeting [“The Digital Perspective” workshop, organized by Edward 
Fredkin, my note] express their optimism concerning the possibility to describe realistic models 
of the Universe in terms of deterministic ‘digital’ scenarios. Most physicists, however, are 
acutely aware of quite severe obstacles against such views. It is important to contemplate these 
obstacles, even if one believes that they will eventually be removed. ’t 'T Hooft [2003], 349. 
 
The models proposed by digital ontologists – when they are subject to testable 
experiments, at least in principle – show implications that are not easily reconcilable 
with many postulates and results commonly obtained in physics and with our current 
understanding of the universe. Here is a very simple illustration: Lloyd [2002] estimates 
that the physical universe, understood as a computational system, could have performed 
10
120
  operations on 10
90
  bits (10
120
 bits including gravitational degrees of freedom) 
since the Big Bang. The problem is that if this were true, the universe would “run out of 
memory”: 
 
To simulate the Universe in every detail since time began, the computer would have to have 10
90
 
bits – binary digits, or devices capable of storing a 1 or a 0 – and it would have to perform 10
120
 
manipulations of those bits. Unfortunately there are probably only around 10
80
 elementary 
particles in the Universe. (Ball [2002, June 3]). 
 
A digital reinterpretation of contemporary physics may be possible in theory. After all, 
discrete systems can approximate continuous systems to increasing degrees of accuracy, 
so it is unlikely that any experiment could rule out the possibility that the world might 
be digital in itself. One might even argue that a digital ontology could be coherent with 
the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, insofar as the former satisfies 
what Goodman described as the multiple-realization characteristic of digital states.
11
 
                                                 
11
 Schmidhuber [forthcoming] maintains that “computing all evolutions of all universes is much cheaper 
in terms of information requirements than computing just one particular, arbitrarily chosen evolution” 
(see version online at http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/node3.html). However, if there are no 
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The history of the world would then be more like a (discrete) chess game, in which 
every move generates a different state and hence a parallel universe, rather than a 
(continuous) football game, in which every tiny (as tiny as one may wish it to be) little 
difference, e.g. in the trajectory of the ball, would generate another world. What seems 
to be the case, however, is that, if digital ontology seeks to advance our understanding 
of the physical universe by providing a “conceptual strategy of looking at physics in 
terms of digital processes” (Fredkin [2003a]), then its success would represent a 
profound change in our scientific practices and outlook. Quite a bit of our contemporary 
understanding of the universe is firmly based not only on discrete but also on many 
analogue ideas (the real numbers, continuous functions, differential equations, Fourier 
transforms, waves, force fields, the continuum)
12
 which seem to be difficult to replace 
entirely. Of course, this is not a final argument against digital ontology, for our 
analogue understanding of the universe may turn out to be digitally reinterpretable after 
all. But, as acknowledged by ’t Hooft in the quotation above, the burden of showing 
how it can actually be replaced, and why it should, is definitely on the shoulders of the 
digital ontologists. A quote from Einstein well highlights the overall difficulty:  
 
I consider it quite possible that physics cannot be based on the field concept, i. e., on continuous 
structures. In that case, nothing remains of my entire castle in the air gravitation theory included, 
[and of] the rest of modern physics.
13
  
 
If digital ontologists are right, then the “analogue” tradition that goes from Newton to 
Einstein will be deeply affected, as digital ontologists are willing to acknowledge.
14
 
This is one of the reasons why, although contemporary particle physics and astrophysics 
increasingly depend on e-science,
15
 they are currently not digital-ontology-friendly. 
                                                                                                                                               
sufficient particles for Lloyd’s computations, it is unclear how there might be sufficient particles for 
Schmidhuber’s. 
12
 For a very instructive analysis of the “interplay between discrete and continuous behaviors and 
corresponding modelings in physics” see Lesne [2007]. 
13
 Einstein, 1954, in a letter to Besso, quoted in Pais [2005], p. 467. 
14
 At least this is the way digital ontologists see the impact of their work and how it is perceived by some 
of their contemporaries, see for example the list of reviews of Wolfram [2002] available at 
http://www.wolframscience.com/coverage.html  and at 
http://www.math.usf.edu/~eclark/ANKOS_reviews.html 
15
 The term refers to any computationally intensive scientific research that relies on distributed network 
environments, very powerful processing capacities and very large data sets. 
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Steven Weinberg, another Nobel laureate in physics, has well expressed such lack of 
sympathy when talking about Wolfram’s version of Zuse Thesis: 
 
Wolfram himself is a lapsed elementary particle physicist, and I suppose he can't resist trying to 
apply his experience with digital computer programs to the laws of nature. This has led him to 
the view (also considered in a 1981 article by Richard Feynman) that nature is discrete rather 
than continuous. He suggests that space consists of a network of isolated points, like cells in a 
cellular automaton, and that even time flows in discrete steps. Following an idea of Edward 
Fredkin, he concludes that the universe itself would then be an automaton, like a giant computer. 
It's possible, but I can't see any motivation for these speculations, except that this is the sort of 
system that Wolfram and others have become used to in their work on computers. So might a 
carpenter, looking at the moon, suppose that it is made of wood. Weinberg [24 October 2002]. 
 
To summarise and simplify, it would be a mistake to confuse the predicative use of 
“digital” (“digital physics” is the study of the laws of the universe helped by digital-
computational instruments) with its attributive use (“digital physics” is the study of the 
intrinsically digital-computational nature of the laws of the universe). A lot of 
contemporary physics is digital in the predicative sense, not in the attributive sense.  
So much for question (a). Regarding question (b), namely whether the ultimate 
nature of the physical universe might be intrinsically digital and computational, does 
digital ontology fare any better with contemporary metaphysics? Is the latter any more 
“attributive-friendly”? In the rest of the paper, I shall argue that it is not. As I wrote 
earlier, the argument leads to a Kantian conclusion: it is not so much that reality in itself 
is not digital, but rather that, in a metaphysical context, the digital vs. analogue 
dichotomy is not applicable.  
 
3. The Thought Experiment 
Let me first provide an overall view of the argument and then of the thought experiment 
through which I will expound it. 
If the ultimate nature of reality in itself is digital, this implies that it is either 
digital or analogue,
16
 so the premise can be refuted by showing that the disjunctive 
conclusion is mistaken. This can be achieved in two steps.  
                                                 
16
 For the sake of simplicity, I shall treat the or as the logic disjunction, and hence as equivalent to 
asserting that reality in itself is either digital/discrete (grainy) or continuous/analogue (smooth) or hybrid 
(lumpy). Nothing depends on this simplification. 
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The first step consists in arguing that, even assuming that reality in itself is 
indeed digital or analogue, an epistemic agent, confronted by what appears to be an (at 
least partly) analogue world of experience, could not establish whether its source (that 
is, reality in itself as the source of the agent’s experience or knowledge) is digital (or 
analogue).  
One could object, however, that this first, epistemological step is merely 
negative, for it establishes, at best, only the unknowability of the intrinsically digital (or 
analogue) nature of reality lying behind the world of experience, not that reality in itself 
is not digital (or analogue). Independently of the epistemic access enjoyed by an agent – 
the objection continues – logic dictates that reality must be assumed to be 
digital/discrete (grainy) or continuous/analogue (smooth).  
So the second step is more positive and ontological. It consists in showing that 
the initial concession, made in the first step, can be withdrawn: the intrinsic nature of 
reality does not have to be digital or analogue because the dichotomy might well be 
misapplied. Reality is experienced, conceptualised and known as digital or analogue 
depending on the level of abstraction (LoA) assumed by the epistemic agent when 
interacting with it. Digital and analogue are features of the LoA modelling the system, 
not of the modelled system in itself. 
The negative result of the argument is that one cannot know whether reality is 
intrinsically digital or analogue not only because of inherent limitations in the type of 
epistemic access to reality that one may enjoy, but also because reality in itself might be 
just the wrong sort of thing to which these categories are being applied. The positive 
result of the argument is that there are ontologies – in particular those supported by 
ontic structural realism and by informational structural realism – that treat the ultimate 
nature of reality as relational. And since relations are neither digital nor analogue nor a 
combination of the two, the negative conclusion clears the ground from a potential 
confusion between digital and informational ontology and makes room for the 
development of the latter, as we shall see in section five.  
In order to develop the arguments just outlined, I shall rely on a thought 
experiment. This is divided into four stages. At each stage an ideal agent will be 
introduced in order to make the argument more intuitive and vivid. 
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1) stage one sets up a scenario in which reality in itself is assumed to be either 
digital or analogue.  
This satisfies the initial concession, made in the first, negative, epistemological step 
seen above, which assumes the world to be digital or analogue. At this stage, we shall 
need an ideal agent capable of showing that reality in itself is either digital or analogue. 
Call this agent Michael.  
Recall now that the argument is that an epistemic agent, who is confronted by what 
appears to be an (at least partly) analogue world of experience, cannot establish whether 
reality in itself is digital or analogue. So  
2) stage two is where the epistemic agent – which we have not specified yet – is 
provided with an analogue world of experience that is based on reality in itself, 
which, following the previous stage, is assumed to be digital or analogue.  
Stage (2) is a simplification of what one of the supporters of digital ontology has aptly 
defined as “the stubborn legacy of the continuum” (Margolus [2003], p. 309). Epistemic 
agents experience the world as (at least partly, if not mainly) analogue. So an easy way 
of understanding stage (2) is by interpreting it as providing an analogue interface 
between reality in itself – which has been assumed to be digital or analogue at stage (1) 
– and an epistemic agent who experiences it (see stage (3). Call the agent responsible 
for translating reality in itself (whether digital or analogue) into an analogue world of 
experience Gabriel.  
Once Gabriel (i.e. the interface) has translated Michael’s digital or analogue reality 
into an analogue world, we move to: 
3) stage three, where the epistemic agent is shown to be incapable of establishing 
whether the source (reality in itself, assumed as either digital or analogue in 
stage one) of the analogue, experienced world (obtained at stage two) is 
intrinsically digital or analogue. 
This will be argued by using the method of abstraction (more on this in section 3.3.1). 
The epistemic agent observes his analogue world at an endless number of levels of 
abstraction, can never reach an end in his informational explorations, and hence can 
never know whether there is a digital ontology behind the observable world. Call the 
third, epistemic agent Rafael.  
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Once Rafael (the epistemic agent) is shown to be unable to establish the digital (or 
analogue) nature of reality in itself, one still needs to answer the objection according to 
which this conclusion, even if granted, shows nothing about the actual nature of reality 
in itself. So, what has been called above the second, positive, ontological step, requires 
4) stage four, where the concession made at stage one is withdrawn, and it is shown 
that the alternative digital vs. analogue may easily be misapplied, when talking 
about reality in itself, because the latter could be neither, while it might be 
experienced as either digital or analogue depending on how the epistemic agent 
is related to it.  
At this last stage, a fourth agent, call it Uriel, is needed in order to show that the same 
reality can be observed as being digital or analogue, depending on the epistemic 
position of the observer (Rafael) and the level of abstraction adopted. 
Stage four concludes the thought experiment against digital ontology. A final 
note on the four agents might still be in order before seeing the details of the argument. 
These agents are ideal because they are endowed with the following boundless (i.e. 
always sufficient yet not infinite) resources:  
i) time, to be interpreted computationally as the number of steps required to achieve a 
specific task; 
ii) space, to be interpreted computationally as memory; and  
iii) accuracy, to be interpreted computationally as the degree of precision of an 
operation, which is assumed (the accuracy) to be increasable to whatever level may be 
required.
17
 
Thus the four agents resemble Turing Machines. This is important because the digital 
ontologist, of all people, will hardly object to their assumption as perfectly conceivable. 
For a more colourful and vivid representation, I have proposed to call them Michael, 
Gabriel, Raphael and Uriel. The reader may recognise them as the four archangels and 
indeed some of their iconological properties turn out to be nicely consistent with their 
tasks in each stage, hence the choice. But of course nothing hangs on this, and the reader 
                                                 
17
 For example, the degree of accuracy depends on how many figures or decimal places are used in 
rounding off the number. The result of a calculation or measurement (such as 13.429314) might be 
rounded off to three (13.429) or two decimal places. The first answer is more accurate than the second. 
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who finds the analogy or the names unhelpful is invited to translate the four agents into 
M, G, R and U.
18
 
Let us now consider each stage and the overall argument in more detail. 
 
3.1 Stage 1: Reality in itself is Digital or Analogue 
Suppose our ideal agent, Michael, enjoys a God’s eye view of reality in itself (the sort 
of approach criticised by Dewey) and has access to its intrinsic nature, what Kant called 
the noumenal. Whatever the noumenal reality is in itself – call it stuff – we assume that 
Michael is able to manipulate it and test whether it is digital/discrete or 
analogue/continuous. He first shapes this stuff into an ordered set, by applying some 
total ordering relation (e.g. “is to the right of”). For the sake of simplicity, we can 
represent the result geometrically, as a line. Michael then uses his sword to obtain a 
Dedekind cut (Dedekind [1963]).
19
 Following Dedekind’s geometrical description,
20
 
Michael’s sword could not be sharper: it has length but no thickness. When it cuts (i.e., 
intersects) the line, it divides it into two disjoint, non-empty parts, left and right. If the 
point at which the sword cuts the line belongs to either the left or the right half, then that 
point corresponds to a rational number. If the point belongs to neither (if neither subset 
of the rationals contains it), then it corresponds to an irrational number.
21
 Now, let us 
make the process iterative, so that the output of each operation becomes the input of the 
next operation. Suppose Michael is able to Dedekind-cut the line indefinitely, without 
his sword ever going through any empty space. Michael takes the right part, Dedekind-
cuts it again, drops the left part, picks up the new right part, Dedekind-cuts it again, and 
so forth, never halting and never being able to drive his sword between two points (or 
corresponding numbers) without hitting another point (number). In this case, Michael’s 
                                                 
18
 Philosophy has already seen its fair share of demons, think of Socrates’ inquisitive demon, Descartes’ 
malicious demon, Laplace’s deterministic demon, or Maxwell’s intelligent demon. Time for the angels to 
have a comeback. 
19
 Intuitively, a Dedekind cut is a partition of the set of rational numbers into two non-empty subsets, in 
such a way as to uniquely define a real number. 
20
 Dedekind’s Schnitt is a cut in the geometric sense, that is, it is the intersection of a line with another 
line that crosses it, see Dedekind [1963]. 
21
 To be more precise, the goal of a Dedekind’s cut is to construct each real number as a pair (L, R) of sets 
of rationals such that every rational is in exactly one of the sets, and every rational in L is smaller that 
every rational in R. This couple is called a Dedekind cut. However, the distinction between “construction” 
and “correspondence” is not relevant here.  
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noumenal reality is dense
22
 and continuous, like the set of the real numbers. Suppose, on 
the contrary, that when Michael tries to Dedekind-cut the line, the point at which the 
sword intersects the line belongs to either the left or the right half. Or, to put it 
differently, Michael’s sword is so sharp that it can miss the line by going through its 
gaps, which correspond to missing points (imagine a line in which the irrational 
numbers have been knocked off). Then Michael’s noumenal reality is no longer 
continuous but discrete, and either still dense (like the rationals, which are closed under 
division), in which case he will not halt; or not even dense (like the integers, which are 
not closed under division), in which case he will halt. If reality is continuous or 
analogue, the output of Michael’s process may consist, physically, of waves or fields, 
for example; mathematically, they would be equivalent to the real numbers. On the 
other hand, if reality is discrete, the output of Michael’s process may consist of the 
atoms of any Democritean physics, of the natural numbers of the Pythagoreans, of 
Leibniz’s indivisible monads or of the bits of the digital ontologists (see Figure 1).
23
 
At the end of this first stage, reality in itself can be assumed to be digital or 
analogue, with no further ontological commitment required, depending on the output of 
Michael’s operation. 
 
                                                 
22
 An ordered set (e.g. the rationals) is dense if any two of its elements have an element in between.   
23
 For a similar idea, but applied to simple divisibility, see Kant’s description of “annihilating 
composition in thought” and what Holden [2004] defines as metaphysical divisibility. Holden 
characterises metaphysical divisibility as divisibility which is logically possible, and distinguishes it from 
physical divisibility (physically possible), formal divisibility (based on distinguishable parts in space) and 
intellectual divisibility (a weaker notion of logical or metaphysical divisibility, based on the possibility of 
being able to imagine the division). 
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Figure 1 First stage of the thought experiment, Michael’s sword. 
 
 
3.2 Stage 2: The Stubborn Legacy of the Analogue 
The second stage involves Gabriel and his message (see Figure 2). Recall that Gabriel is 
an ideal agent working as an interface between reality in itself (Michael the source) and 
the world as observed by the epistemic agent (Raphael the observer). If Michael’s 
ontology is analogue, Gabriel uses it as his input to produce an analogue reality 
(henceforth also called the system). On the other hand, if Michael’s ontology is digital, 
Gabriel puts it through a DAC (a Digital to Analogue Converter) to produce an 
analogue reality. In both cases, Gabriel might need an amplifier to produce his output, 
that is, an analogue system (a continuous world) like the one observed by the epistemic 
no gaps 
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cutting 
Reality in itself is 
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dense (e.g. reals) 
Michael never misses  
his target nor does he halt. 
stuff 
Reality in itself is 
not continuous only  
dense (e.g. rationals) 
Reality in itself is 
neither continuous  
nor dense (e.g. integers) 
Michael misses his target 
but never halts. 
Michael misses  
his target and halts. 
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agent. At the end of this second stage, Gabriel’s output (his message) consists of an 
endlessly updated flow of analogue data. This is the analogue system made available to 
the observer, Raphael. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Second stage of the thought experiment, Gabriel’s message. 
 
 
3.3 Stage 3: The Observer’s Analysis 
Gabriel’s message, that is, the analogue system comparable to the world surrounding us, 
is now observed by Raphael, the epistemic agent, who is on the other side of the screen, 
as it were (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). Raphael, like us, can adopt any level of 
abstraction to study and analyse the analogue system and formulate his theory about it 
(the space within the dotted line in Figure 3). So, in order to understand what this 
involves, we need to pause for a moment and briefly consider what a level of abstraction 
is. 
 
analogue 
system 
Gabriel’s interface  
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M’s analogue 
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3.3.1 The Method of Levels of Abstraction 
The method of LoA comes from modelling techniques developed in an area of 
Computer Science, known as Formal Methods, in which discrete mathematics is used to 
specify and analyse the behaviour of information systems. What follows is rather 
standard knowledge in computer science, and the interested reader is referred to the 
relevant literature for further details (see for example De Roever and Engelhardt [1998], 
Hoare and He [1998], and Floridi and Sanders [2004]). Before introducing a quick 
summary of the method of levels of abstraction, an everyday example may be useful.  
Suppose we wish to describe the state of a traffic light in Rome. We might 
decide to consider an observable, named colour, of type {red, amber, green} that 
corresponds to the colour indicated by the light. This option abstracts the length of time 
for which the particular colour has been displayed, the brightness of the light, the height 
of the traffic light, and so on. So the choice of type corresponds to a decision about how 
the phenomenon is to be regarded. To specify such a traffic light for the purpose of 
construction, a more appropriate type might comprise a numerical measure of 
wavelength. Furthermore, if we are in Oxford, the type of colour would be a little more 
complex, since – in addition to red, amber and green – red and amber are displayed 
simultaneously for part of the cycle. So, an appropriate type would be {red, amber, 
green, red-amber}. What we have just seen is a basic concept of level of abstraction 
(LoA), understood as a finite but non-empty set of observables, where an observable is 
just an interpreted typed variable, that is, a typed variable together with a statement of 
what feature of the system under consideration it stands for. 
The definition of observables is only the first step in studying a system at a 
given LoA. The second step consists in deciding what relationships hold between the 
observables. This, in turn, requires the introduction of the concept of system 
“behaviour”.  
Not all values exhibited by combinations of observables in a LoA may be 
realised by the system being modelled. For example, if the four traffic lights in Oxford 
are modelled by four observables, each representing the colour of a light, the lights 
should not in fact all be green together (assuming they work properly). In other words, 
the combination in which each observable is green should not be realised in the system 
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being modelled, although the types chosen allow it. Some technique is therefore 
required to describe those combinations of observable values that are actually 
acceptable. The most general method is simply to describe all the allowed combinations 
of values. Such a description is determined by a predicate, whose allowed combinations 
of values we call the “system behaviours”. A behaviour of a system, at a given LoA, is 
defined to consist of a predicate whose free variables are observables at that LoA. The 
substitutions of values for observables that make the predicate true are called the system 
behaviours.  
A moderated LoA is defined to consist of a LoA together with a behaviour at 
that LoA. For example, human height does not take arbitrary rational values, for it is 
always positive and has an upper limit of (say) nine feet. The variable h, representing 
height, is therefore constrained to reflect reality by defining its behaviour to consist of 
the predicate 0 < h < 9, in which case any value of h in that interval is a “system” 
behaviour.  
Since Newton and Leibniz, the behaviours of the analogue observables have 
typically been described by differential equations. A small change in one observable 
results in a small, quantified change in the overall system behaviour. Accordingly, it is 
the rates at which those continuous observables vary which is most conveniently 
described. The desired behaviour of the system then consists of the solution of the 
differential equations. However, this is a special case of a predicate: the predicate holds 
at just those values satisfying the differential equation. If a complex system is 
approximated by simpler systems, then the differential calculus provides a method for 
quantifying the approximation. The use of predicates to demarcate system behaviour is 
essential in any (nontrivial) analysis of discrete systems because in the latter no such 
continuity holds: the change of an observable by a single value may result in a radical 
and arbitrary change in system behaviour. Yet, complexity demands some kind of 
comprehension of the system in terms of simple approximations. When this is possible, 
the approximating behaviours are described exactly, by a predicate, at a given LoA, and 
it is the LoAs that vary, becoming more comprehensive and embracing more detailed 
behaviours, until the final LoA accounts for the desired behaviours. Thus, the formalism 
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provided by the method of abstraction can be seen as doing for discrete systems what 
differential calculus has traditionally done for analogue systems. 
Specifying the LoA at which one is working means clarifying, from the outset, 
the range of questions that (a) can be meaningfully asked and (b) are answerable in 
principle. In standard terminology, the input of a LoA consists of the system under 
analysis, comprising a set of data; its output is a model of the system, comprising 
information. The quantity of information in a model varies with the LoA: a lower LoA, 
of greater resolution or finer granularity, produces a model that contains more 
information than a model produced at a higher, or more abstract, LoA. Thus, a given 
LoA provides a quantified commitment to the kind and amount of information that can 
be “extracted” from a system. The choice of a LoA pre-determines the type and quantity 
of data that can be considered and hence the information that can be contained in the 
model. So, knowing at which LoA the system is being analysed is indispensable, for it 
means knowing the scope and limits of the model being developed. 
 Let us now return to Raphael’s theory. 
 
3.3.2 The Observer’s Endless Levels of Abstraction 
As we have seen, Raphael can observe the analogue system, produced by Gabriel on the 
basis of Michael’s input, at an endless number of LoA. This is tantamount to saying that 
Raphael may avail himself of as many different interfaces as he wishes in order to 
analyse the system (metaphorically: in order to read Gabriel’s analogue message), each 
of which will provide further information about the system itself. Figure 3 summarises 
this point. 
Raphael never halts. This is just a colourful way of saying that, outside our 
thought experiment, analogue systems are closed under modelling at levels of 
abstraction, or, which is the same thing, there is no finite number of levels of 
abstractions that can provide all possible models of an analogue system.  
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Figure 3 Third stage of the thought experiment, Raphael’s LoAs. 
 
The observer (Raphael and us) can extract an endless amount of semantic information
24
 
from an analogue system, so it requires an endless amount of computation to describe 
even the simplest system. Some people find this intellectually unpleasant. Richard 
Feynman was one of them and this is why we have seen (cf. the quotation from 
Weinberg in § 2.1) that he is some times listed among the digital ontologists. Here is 
how he phrased the problem:  
 
It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we understand them today, it takes a 
computing machine [our Raphael] an infinite number of logical operations to figure out what 
goes on in no matter how tiny a region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time [our 
analogue system]. How can all that be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite 
amount of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do? So I have often 
made the hypothesis that ultimately physics will not require a mathematical statement, that in the 
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 The specification “semantic” is there to prevent one from mistaking this fact for a contradiction of 
Shannon’s fundamental theorem according to which, if we “Let a source have entropy H (bits per symbol) 
and a channel have a capacity C (bits per second). Then it is possible to encode the output of the source in 
such a way as to transmit at the average rate of C/H – ε symbols per second over the channel where ε is 
arbitrarily small. It is not possible to transmit at an average rate greater than C/H. (Shannon and Weaver 
[1949 rep. 1998], 59). Shannon’s limiting result states that if you devise a good code you can transmit 
symbols over a noiseless channel at an average rate as close to C/H as one may wish but, no matter how 
clever the coding is, that average can never exceed C/H. The limit can be extended to memory devices, 
which can contain only a certain amount of syntactic information.   
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end the machinery will be revealed, and the laws will turn out to be simple, like the chequer 
board with all its apparent complexities. (Feynman [1992], pp. 57-58).
25
  
 
However, to anyone acquainted with Kant’s philosophy, the boundless informational-
richness of the world comes as no surprise. The system under observation (Gabriel’s 
message read by Raphael) works a bit like the noumenal. For the method of levels of 
abstraction allows one to understand that reality in itself though not epistemically 
inaccessible it remains an epistemically inexhaustible resource out of which knowledge 
is constructed. 
Since Raphael never halts, he can never know whether the world is digital or 
analogue. On the one hand, if the world were digital, there might be a theoretical 
possibility of knowing it, but it probably is not, or at least Raphael’s and our knowledge 
of the world, inescapably mediated by some LoA, seem to point in the opposite 
direction. It is of no avail to object that even in our thought experiment we have 
assumed the existence of four agents/archangels resembling four digital Turing 
Machines. As Turing himself remarked, even in the case of actual digital artefacts:  
 
The digital computers [...] may be classified amongst the “discrete state machines”, these are the 
machines which move by sudden jumps or clicks from one quite definite state to another. These 
states are sufficiently different for the possibility of confusion between them to be ignored. 
Strictly speaking there are no such machines. Everything really moves continuously (my 
emphasis). But there are many kinds of machine, which can profitably be thought of as being 
discrete state machines. (Turing [1950], p. 439) 
  
By “profitably be thought of” Turing was really referring to the level of abstraction at 
which “many kinds of machine” are analysed as “discrete state machines”. In other 
words, even our agents are, deep down, better understood by us as analogue agents. The 
world, at least as we and Raphael experience it, might well be analogue, and the digital 
only a convenient abstraction or the result (and technical exploitation) of some physical 
features in our artefacts.  
On the other hand, Raphael, and ourselves with him, cannot exclude either 
empirically or in principle that reality in itself might actually be digital, i.e. discrete. For 
                                                 
25
 Because of similar statements, Feynman is sometimes listed among the digital ontologists but, to be fair 
to Feynman, the quotation continues “But this speculation is of the same nature as those other people 
make – ‘I like it’, ‘I don’t like it’, – and it is not good to be prejudiced about these things”. 
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the endless amount of information that Raphael can extract from Gabriel’s message says 
nothing about the presence or absence of some ultimate indivisibilia. 
At this point, the doubt that naturally comes to one’s mind is whether the 
analogue/continuous vs. digital/discrete dichotomy may be sound at all, or at least 
whether its application to the description of the intrinsic nature of reality may not be 
misguided. Kant thought it was. And I agree that it is. Analogue/continuous and 
digital/discrete are modes of presentation of Being, i.e. ways in which a system is 
modelled (experienced or conceptualised) by an observer (an epistemic agent) at a given 
level of abstraction. The last stage in our thought experiment consists in trying to 
understand how this could be the case.  
 
3.4 Digital and Analogue are Features of the Level of Abstraction 
From the observer’s position, which is Raphael’s as well as ours, it is impossible to 
establish whether reality in itself (the noumenal) is analogue or digital. In the Critique 
of Pure Reason, Kant had already convincingly argued, although in very different terms, 
against the soundness of the dichotomy and its correct application. As is well-known, 
each of the four antinomies discussed by Kant comprises a thesis and an antithesis, 
which are supposed to be both reasonable and irreconcilable. The one which interests us 
here is the second. Paraphrasing Kant, it states that (A 434-5/B 462-3): 
(Digital) Thesis: the world is discrete; everything in the world consists of 
elements that are ultimately simple and hence indivisible. 
(Analogue) Antithesis: the world is continuous; nothing in the world is simple, 
but everything is composite and hence infinitely divisible. 
As Kant argues, the conflict is not between empirical experience and logical analysis. 
Rather, the antinomies, ours included, are generated by an unconstrained demand for 
unconditioned answers to fundamental problems concerning (1) time and space, (2) 
complexity/granularity, (3) causality and freedom or (4) modality. Kant is right: striving 
for the unconditioned is equivalent to the natural, yet profoundly mistaken, attempt to 
analyse a system (the world in itself, for Kant) independently of any (specification of 
the) level of abstraction at which the analysis is being conducted, the questions are 
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being posed and hence the answers are being offered. In other words, trying to overstep 
the limits set by the adopted LoAs leads to conceptual confusions. 
Kant divides the antinomies into two groups. Ours belongs to the first, in which 
both the thesis and the antithesis are untenable because the search for the unconditioned 
mistakes time and space and complexity/granularity for features of the system instead of 
realising that they are properties set by (or constituting) the level of abstraction at which 
the system is investigated and hence, as such, subject to alternative formatting. 
Assuming for the sake of simplicity that a LoA is comparable to an interface, it makes 
no sense to wonder whether the system under observation is finite in time, space and 
granularity in itself, independently of the LoA at which it is being analysed, since this is 
a feature of the interface inherited by the model, and, with some flexibility, different 
interfaces may be adopted depending on needs, requirements and goals, i.e. 
teleologically. So, although on the basis of a LoA approach, I cannot but agree with 
Kant: neither the thesis nor the antithesis is tenable. A good way of making sense of this 
conclusion in our thought experiment is by referring to a fourth and last agent, Uriel, the 
“sharpest sighted spirit of all in Heaven”, as Milton called him in Paradise Lost. 
Uriel builds a wheel in which there are four nodes (see Figure 4). Each node 
contains either a DAC (digital to analogue converter) or an ADC (analogue to digital 
converter). Since it is possible to convert information from analogue into digital form 
and back again with as little loss of detail as needed, Uriel’s wheel generates a system – 
as an output from an analogue or digital ontology – which will be observed by Raphael 
as being either analogue or digital depending on the latter’s position with respect to the 
wheel. It is now obvious that it makes no sense to ask whether the system is digital or 
analogue in itself. We have discharged our initial assumption about reality in itself 
being digital or analogue.  
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Figure 4 Fourth stage of the thought experiment, Uriel’s wheel. 
 
All this is less “philosophical” than it might seem. In quantum mechanics, we are used 
to seeing a similar effect, known as the wave-particle duality. The basic idea is that all 
objects (both micro- and macroscopic) enjoy properties associated both with continuous 
waves and with discrete particles, in short, that objects have a dual nature, partly wave-
like and partly particle-like. Although this is experimentally detectable only on very 
small scales, the factual results are well-known and indisputable, if puzzling in terms of 
interpretation. The classic double-slit experiment (see Figure 5), for example, shows 
that, if only one slit is open at a time, the individual photons fired against it that manage 
to go through the slit and hit the screen on the other side at different times generate a 
pattern with a single peak, behaving like tiny bullets.
26
 However, if both slits are open at 
the same time, the individual photons, still hitting the screen at different times, generate 
a wave-like interference pattern. In the conceptual frame presented in this paper, the 
slits act as a hardwired (physically implemented) level of abstraction: change the level 
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 To be precise, in real experiments one cannot really distinguish between two plausible explanations for 
the observed result (a) electrons are classical particles, i.e. they behave just like bullets fired from a gun 
and (b) electrons are wave trains, i.e. waves of finite length. The real difficulty occurs when both slits are 
open and the single electrons, sent at separate times, like as many bullets, end up generating a typical 
interference pattern as if they were waves (no matter of what length). 
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(open or close the slits) and the beam of individual photons or electrons will be 
(observed as) behaving “digitally” or “analogically”, like bullets or like waves, 
presenting a world that is discrete or continuous, not in itself, but in relation to the 
observer’s LoA. Similar effects can be shown with electrons and other particles. 
Experiments that test particle properties show that electrons behave as if they were 
particles, and experiments that test wave properties show that electrons behave as if they 
were waves. The ways in which one has epistemic access to the system affect the 
outcome of the analysis or experiment. As Lesne [2007] has well synthesised:  
 
In conclusion, physics in all instances is an interplay between discrete and continuous features, 
mainly because any such feature actually characterizes a representation, from a given observer, 
of the real system and its evolution. [...] In practice, the choice between discrete and continuous 
models should be substantiated with the comparison between the respective scales of description, 
observation, variations (e.g. gradient scales, oscillation periods, or inhomogeneity sizes) and 
correlations [what in this paper has been called the method of abstraction, my addition]. [...] 
Paradoxes and inconsistencies between discrete and continuous viewpoints only appear when 
forgetting that our descriptions, and even physical laws, are only idealized abstractions, tangent 
to reality in an appropriate scale range, unavoidably bounded above and below. [...] Any 
physical theory is in the same way based on a representation of the system and deals only with 
this representation, while the reality always remains beyond and is never fully captured. Lesne 
[2007], pp. 35-36. 
 
Kant might have agreed. I certainly do. Raphael observes Uriel’s world as analogue or 
digital depending on his position (LoA) with respect to it. What remains invariant in 
Uriel’s world, from Raphael’s perspective, cannot be its digital or its analogue nature, 
but rather the structural properties that give rise to a digital or analogue reality. These 
invariant, structural properties are what science is mainly interested in. So it seems 
reasonable to move from an ontology of things – to which it is difficult no to apply the 
digital/discrete vs. analogue/continuous alternative – to an ontology of structural 
relations, to which it is immediately obvious that the previous dichotomy is irrelevant. 
This is precisely the step taken, in the current debate on scientific realism, by supporters 
of different forms of structural realism.
27
 The step is important, and deserves a final 
comment by way of conclusion. 
 
                                                 
27
 For an overview see Worrall [1989] and Ladyman [1998].  
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Figure 5 Double-slit experiment: single electrons hitting the screen build up wave-like patterns over 
time. Reprinted by courtesy of Dr. Akira Tonomura, Hitachi, Ltd., Japan. 
 
 
4. Three Objections and Replies 
The case against digital ontology can now be reinforced by clearing the ground of three 
potential objections.
28
  
One may contend that the argument begs the question. For it builds an analogue 
reality through the interface represented by Gabriel – no matter whether the original 
source (that is, Michael’s world) is intrinsically digital or analogue – but then it purports 
to show that Raphael (an agent like us), by having access to this analogue reality, cannot 
determine whether its original source is digital. Unsurprisingly, Raphael is trapped in a 
(perception of the) world as analogue, but this is merely what is already presupposed. 
The objection can be answered by recalling that the goal of the argument is to 
establish that both a digital and an analogue ontology are untenable. The argument seeks 
to achieve this conclusion by making a crucial use of the boundless number of levels of 
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 In this section I have summarised several questions and objections that I have received during and after 
the conference, when the paper circulated among several colleagues. I take full responsibility for their 
specific formulation, although many are as close as possible to the original formats. 
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abstraction at which an analogue reality may be observed. So, the argument would 
indeed be begging the question if it were positing not Gabriel’s interface, as it does, but 
rather Uriel’s wheel, that is, if the argument were to presuppose that the world is 
digitally/analogously undetermined to begin with. This the argument does not, since 
Uriel’s wheel is introduced only as a fourth step, in order to make sense of the problem 
disclosed by the argument. The second step in the argument relies on the analogue 
interface, represented by Gabriel’s “translation”, because it needs to make explicit the 
starting point that is conceded by all parties involved in the debate, namely that some 
aspects of the world really seem to be intrinsically and irreducibly analogue rather than 
digital, and that it is up to the defender of digital ontology to make a convincing case for 
the opposite view. This is why the section’s title is a paraphrase of Margolus’ comment 
about “the stubborn legacy of the continuum” (the reader may recall that Margolus is 
one of the strong supporters of digital ontology). One may retort that the argument 
would not work were one to assume that Gabriel translates Michael’s world into a 
digital world. The reply is that this is correct but also not relevant here. For the question 
being debated is not: given that some aspects of the world appear to be digital, is a 
digital ontology justified? This is uncontroversial but also uninteresting. The question is 
rather: given that some aspects of the world appear to be analogue, is a digital ontology 
justified? One only needs to recall why the Pythagoreans abandoned their digital 
ontology to understand the pressure exercised by the question. The argument simplifies 
all this by generating a scenario in which Raphael (us) interacts epistemically with an 
analogue reality, at various levels of abstraction, and this scenario is not in need of a 
justification, for it is the starting difficulty under discussion. 
 The defender of a digital ontology might still be unconvinced because of a 
second object. The argument is clearly Kantian, but all it does, at best, is to explain how 
(an aspect of) Kant's metaphysics could be true. It does not show that Kant’s 
metaphysics is true.  So, even conceding that digital ontology may not be a promising 
line of research from a Kantian perspective, this fails to be convincing to anyone who 
does not already share such a transcendental approach. 
 This objection may be answered by starting from the distinction between 
arguing for the same conclusion and arguing in the same way for that conclusion. The 
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conclusion of the argument is indeed Kantian, so it is a matter of scholarship to give to 
Kant what is Kant’s. This may have the further advantage of helping anyone familiar 
with Kant’s philosophy to follow the argument more easily. But the argument itself is 
not based on, nor intends to be an exposition or a vindication of, Kant’s transcendental 
epistemology. Rather, it seeks to provide a different and independent route to the same 
theoretical point, so it should be assessed on its own merits (or lack thereof). To put it 
visually, Kant’s argument and the one presented in this paper are like two lines that 
intersect each other at one point, but coming from, and going in, different directions. So, 
the objection that the argument is unconvincing (that the new route is blocked) because 
it reaches a conclusion also reached by Kant (the intersecting point) is either 
counteractive or ineffective. Counteractive since calling its conclusion Kantian cannot 
weaken the argument, but it might increase its acceptability. For a reader with Kantian 
sympathies may find this convergence reassuring and enlightening, while anyone 
unwilling to follow Kant’s route may still find the one presented here appealing. 
Ineffective because the objection, to be effective, needs to show that (i) the argument is 
just a version of Kant’s argument and that (ii) the latter is wrong, but, even if one were 
to concede (ii), the fact remains that the argument supports a more constructive position 
that is not in itself Kantian at all, as we shall see in the answer to the next objection and 
in the conclusion, so (i) cannot be granted.  
 According to the third and last objection to be discussed here, the argument 
against digital ontology appears to depend on the claim that each LoA has equal right to 
tell us whether the ultimate nature of reality is analogue or digital (each LoA is equally 
valid). However, this is a claim that an opponent is likely to deny. There seems to be no 
reason why each LoA should be granted equal authority in answering questions about 
the ultimate nature of the universe. Some LoA are undoubtedly useful in some contexts 
and not in others, but we have no reason to think that all of them are equally good at 
liming the true structure of reality. In particular, someone might argue that it is 
reasonable that, if our best fundamental physical theory is, say, digital, then this gives us 
good reason to think that the fundamental nature of reality is digital. This is not 
deductive warrant, but it does appear to provide some degree of justification. Therefore, 
for such a critic, when it comes to the question of whether reality is analogue or digital, 
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it does not seem that each LoA should have equal say. The argument needs to do more 
to respond to such a critic. For it seems that it is only against the claim that one can 
adopt a “LoA-free” position and decide from there whether reality is digital or analogue, 
yet this seems a strawman. A realist about the analogue/digital divide is more likely to 
claim that some LoAs are better than others for telling one about the ultimate nature of 
reality, not to claim a miraculous ability to adopt a “LoA-free” position. Furthermore, 
an attack solely on the “LoA-free” position would be insufficient to support the positive 
claim that no LoA is a better guide than any other to the ultimate digital/analogue nature 
of reality. 
 The objection contains an important clarification, which will help to introduce 
the positive defence of informational structural realism, sketched in the next section. 
The clarification is this. The argument is not merely based on the dichotomy “LoA-free” 
vs. “LoA-bounded” approaches to ontology. Although important, this is only the first 
move. Once we accept that epistemology is LoA-based and that no ontology can be 
LoA-free, then a second, but equally crucial move consists in realising that digital and 
analogue are features of the LoAs adopted to analyse reality, not features of reality in 
itself, or, to put it differently, that digital and analogue features are internal features of 
the models made possible by various LoAs, not external features of the systems 
modelled by LoAs. So the argument is not just that some LoAs show reality to be digital 
while others show it to be analogue and that we cannot decide which LoAs are better, 
but, far more importantly, that some LoAs are digital and some are analogue and that, 
depending on which of them we adopt (because of requirements, goals etc., i.e., 
teleologically), reality will be modelled as digital or analogue. The case of the double-
slit experiment was recalled as a clear illustration of the impossibility of determining the 
intrinsically digital vs. analogue nature of reality independently of how it is accessed. 
Now, the objection correctly points out that, even if all this is granted, LoAs are still not 
“born equal”, and not just as a matter of instrumental convenience. One may correctly 
argue, as I have done elsewhere (Floridi and Sanders [2004]), that some LoAs still fit 
better their systems, both in terms of taking full advantages of their affordances and in 
terms of respecting their constrains, and that this is very significant and worth 
accounting for, ontologically. So, the objection continues, perhaps one could work his 
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way inside out, as if were, and try to grasp what the nature of reality might be in itself, 
given the sort of successful LoAs that are adopted on this side of the relation. To use a 
terminology borrowed from computer science, one could try to reverse-engineer the 
output (our models of reality as obtained through our most successful LoAs) in order to 
obtain at least some information about the original input (Michael’s world, or Kant’s 
noumenal world). This is all correct. But we need to be careful about what can be 
actually inferred from this valuable suggestion. Even assuming, and this is very far from 
a trivial concession, that reality might be successfully modelled through a digital (or 
analogue, where the “or” is assumed to be exclusive of the sake of simplicity) ontology 
and that it is not the case that an analogue (or, if talking of an analogue ontology in the 
first place, a digital) ontology may not be equally satisfactory, all this would not show 
that reality is digital (or analogue) in itself. It would only show that our ontological 
commitment in favour of a digital (or analogue) ontology would be safe in the sense that 
we could not be proven wrong because we would be (or, our opponent would argue, we 
would have no way of proving that we are not) taking a feature of our LoAs for a 
feature of the system that they model. This is unsatisfactory. It is the impasse that I have 
tried to describe more intuitively by means of Uriel’s wheel. The exit from this impasse, 
in terms of a defence of a form of realist ontology that is compatible with a non-
relativistic and yet LoA-based epistemology, leads to a non-Kantian position, which 
seeks to reconcile digital and analogue ontology by identifying the minimal 
denominator shared by both. And this is the sort of position that I have defended in the 
constructive paper, under the label structural information realism. So, insofar as the 
objection is correct, it seems that an informational approach to ontology is the best way 
of taking advantage of its lesson.  
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4. Conclusion: Towards Informational Structural Realism 
In this paper, I have argued against the tenability of a digital ontology, and against the 
soundness of the digital vs. analogue dichotomy when applied to our metaphysical 
understanding of reality. The criticism is motivated by the fear that informational 
ontology (according to which the ultimate nature of reality is informational, see Floridi 
[2004] and Floridi [forthcoming]) might be confused with either pancomputationalism 
(according to which the universe is a computational system equivalent to a Turing 
Machine), with a version of digital ontology (according to which the ultimate nature of 
reality is digital) or with a combination of the two (according to which the universe is a 
cellular automaton, for example). The fear is justified, for the risk is real. Take for 
example an influential article by Margolus [2003], in which we read that  
 
Given more than a century of finite-state underpinnings, one might have expected that by now all 
of physics would be based on informational and computational concepts. That this isn’t so may 
simply reflect the stubborn legacy of the continuum, and the recency [sic] and macroscopic 
character of computer science. (p. 309).  
 
The passage conflates the informational and the digital, as if they were synonymous. 
Clearly, they are not, not least because information may easily be analogous or 
continuous. Yet even Wheeler himself fell into the same trap (see the quotation 
provided in § 2). Drawing no distinction between an informational and a digital 
ontology is a mistake. Digital ontology is very implausible and obviously behaves as a 
misleading distraction, when it comes to assessing the value of an informational 
ontology. The latter can be better appreciated once the ground has been cleared of any 
potential confusion. Thus, this paper has provided the preparatory pars destruens 
(digital ontology is a bad idea) of a two-stage piece of research, whose second, pars 
construens (in favour of informational structural realism) has been developed in Floridi 
[forthcoming]. Since the pars construens is really a separate project, what follows is 
only a brief synthesis of Floridi [forthcoming]. 
Informational structural realism (ISR) is a version of structural realism. As a 
form of realism, ISR is committed to the existence of a mind-independent reality 
addressed by, and constraining, our knowledge. It supports the adoption of LoAs that 
carry a minimal ontological commitment in favour of the structural properties of reality 
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and a reflective, equally minimal, ontological commitment in favour of structural 
objects. Unlike other versions of structural realism, ISR supports an informational 
interpretation of these structural objects. This second commitment, in favour of 
structural relata, is justified by epistemic reasons. We are allowed to commit ourselves 
ontologically to whatever minimal conception of objects is useful to make sense of our 
first commitment in favour of structures. The first commitment answers the question 
“what can we know?”; the second commitment answers the question “what can we 
justifiably assume to be there?”. We are now ready for a definition: 
ISR) Explanatorily, instrumentally and predictively successful models (especially, but 
not only, those propounded by scientific theories) of reality at a given LoA can be, in 
the best circumstances, increasingly informative about the relations that obtain between 
the (possibly sub-observable) informational objects that constitute the system under 
investigation (through the observable phenomena).  
A significant consequence of ISR is that, as far as we can tell, the ultimate nature 
of reality is informational, that is, it makes sense to adopt LoAs that commit our 
theories to a view of reality as mind-independent and constituted by structural objects 
that are neither substantial nor material (they might well be, but we have no need to 
suppose them to be so) but cohering clusters of data (not in the alphanumeric sense of 
the word, but in an equally common sense of differences de re, i.e. mind-independent, 
concrete, relational points of lack of uniformity). Structural objects work 
epistemologically like constraining affordances: they allow or invite certain constructs 
(they are affordances for the information systems, like Raphael or us, who elaborate 
them) and resist or impede some others (they are constraints for the same systems), 
depending on the interaction with, and the nature of, the information system that 
processes them. They are exploitable by a theory, at a given LoA, as input of adequate 
queries to produce information (the model) as output. This epistemic malleability of 
reality as a resource seems to be what Chakravartty [2003] defines as the “dispositional 
nature” of structural objects
29
 and Saunders [2003] calls their “heuristic plasticity”. 
When Cassirer talked about structuralism, he had in mind, like Kant and Russell 
before him and Maxwell after him, a full-blooded ontology of objects as structural 
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 Apparently David Lewis held a similar view, see Langton [2004].  
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entities (Gower [2000], French [2001]). Having shown that digital ontology is not a 
promising line of research, we should not throw away every metaphysics vaguely 
resembling it, since an informational ontology and an informational structural realism 
remain valuable options.
30
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